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I.  INTRODUCTION 
During this Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court issued a significant 
opinion addressing key concepts of insurance law, including application of the 
“voluntary payments” condition and allocation among insurers in continuing 
loss situations. Additionally, one Texas appellate court discussed the rights of a 
loss payee under a commercial property policy. Lastly, the Fifth Circuit 
demonstrated application of the “eight-corners” rule in the context of 
“additional insured” determinations along with vague pleadings and elaborated 
on the parameters of the Stowers doctrine. 
II.  COMMERCIAL PROPERTY INSURANCE 
A.  RIGHTS OF A LOSS PAYEE 
In a recent opinion, the Dallas Court of Appeals put building owners on 
notice that simply being named a loss payee under their tenants’ policies may be 
 
 * B.M., Baylor University; J.D., Baylor School of Law. Partner, Wilson Elser, LLP. 
 ** B.Acy., Mississippi State University; J.D., University of Mississippi School of Law. 
Associate, Wilson Elser, LLP. 
 *** B.B.A., Texas Tech University; J.D., Texas Tech University School of Law. Associate, 
Wilson Elser, LLP. 
102 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 1 
insufficient to confer contractual rights to the building owner under their 
tenants’ policies. More specifically, the court of appeal in Ostrovitz & Gwinn, 
LLC v. First Specialty Insurance Company affirmed a summary judgment ruling 
against a commercial landlord, holding that the landlord was not entitled to sue 
under a commercial property policy naming the landlord only as a loss payee.1 
Ostrovitz & Gwinn, LLC (Ostrovitz) leased real property to a pallet 
manufacturer tenant beginning in 1998, with the lease requiring the tenant to 
insure the buildings and name Ostrovitz as an additional insured on that 
policy.2 However, when the lease was renewed in 2003 for an additional five-year 
term, the 2003 lease did not contain any such insurance requirements. After a 
fire damaged the buildings in September 2006, the tenants’ insurer—First 
Specialty Insurance Company (First Specialty)—informed Ostrovitz that it was 
not insured under the policy. Aggrieved, Ostrovitz sued the tenant, First 
Specialty, First Specialty’s agent, and the person who allegedly started the fire, 
asserting claims for breach of contract, various violations of the Texas Insurance 
Code and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, negligence, negligent 
misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, and declaratory judgment. Thereafter, 
First Specialty counterclaimed for declaratory judgment that Ostrovitz could not 
recover under the policy. 
First Specialty moved for summary judgment challenging all of Ostrovitz’s 
claims on various grounds, including some no-evidence grounds under Texas 
Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i).3 Ultimately, the trial court granted First 
Specialty’s traditional motion for summary judgment on all of Ostrovitz’s claims 
except for declaratory judgment. The trial court later granted a no-evidence 
summary judgment for First Specialty, but again expressly denied the motion on 
Ostrovitz’s claim for declaratory judgment. All remaining claims were disposed 
of by separate orders, and as part of this process, Ostrovitz non-suited its 
declaratory judgment claim against First Specialty. Ostrovitz timely appealed. 
The court of appeal began with Ostrovitz’s breach of contract claims, noting 
that the general law of contracts applicable to insurance policies requires either 
privity or third-party beneficiary status in order to have standing to sue for 
breach of contract.4 Under Texas law, privity exists where the defendant “was a 
party to an enforceable contract with either the plaintiff or someone who 
assigned his or her cause of action to the plaintiff.”5 Applying these principles, 
and considering only the policy language itself, the court concluded that 
Ostrovitz was not a party to the policy and, therefore, not in privity with First 
Specialty.6 Texas courts have generally held that a property insurance policy is a 
personal contract between the insured and the insurer.7 Because Ostrovitz was 
 
 1. Ostrovitz & Gwinn, LLC v. First Specialty Ins. Co., 393 S.W.3d 379, 392 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2012, no pet.). 
 2. Id. at 383. 
 3. Id. at 384. 
 4. Id. at 387 (citing OAIC Commercial Assets, L.L.C. v. Stonegate Vill., L.P., 234 S.W.3d 
726, 738 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 387–88. 
 7. Id. at 388 (citing Travelers Fire Ins. Co. v. Steinmann, 276 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Tex. Civ. 
App.—Dallas 1955, writ ref’d n.r.e.)). 
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neither a named insured nor an additional insured under the policy, and did 
not allege that it was assigned a breach-of-contract claim by someone in privity 
with First Specialty, there was no privity between Ostrovitz and First Specialty.8 
Next, the court of appeal proceeded to determine whether Ostrovitz had 
standing as a third-party beneficiary to the policy. Under Texas law, in order to 
qualify as a third-party beneficiary, “a third party must show that it is either a 
donee or creditor beneficiary of the contract, and not one who is benefited only 
incidentally by its performance.”9 In ascertaining this status, the intention of the 
contracting parties controls: “[t]he intention to contract or confer a direct 
benefit to a third party must be clearly and fully spelled out or enforcement by 
the third party must be denied.”10 Further, all doubt must be resolved against 
conferring third-party beneficiary status.11 In Ostrovitz, the court explained that 
any rule requiring that ambiguities in an insurance policy be resolved in favor of 
coverage does not apply to the third-party beneficiary analysis.12 Accordingly, the 
court began its third-party beneficiary analysis with the clear and express 
language of the policy.13 
Here, the court of appeal quoted the policy’s “Loss Conditions” Section E., 
4., “Loss Payment,”14 which the court read to mean that the insurer “reserves 
the right—but assumes no obligation—to adjust losses with and pay an owner of 
covered property who is not a named insured.”15 In other words, the provision 
did not “clearly show an intent by [the tenant named insured] and First Specialty 
to confer a direct benefit on [Ostrovitz].”16 Rather, the provision merely 
conferred a right on First Specialty by providing the option to pay owners of 
covered property where the owners are not named insureds, and in satisfaction 
of the named insured’s claim for loss to the owner’s property.17 Lastly, the court 
discussed the policy’s “loss payable” provision18, which the court again 
 
 8. Id. at 387–88. 
 9. Id. at 388 (citing MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co., 995 S.W.2d 647, 651 
(Tex. 1999)). 
 10. Id. (accord Basic Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Dynex Commercial, Inc., 348 S.W.3d 894, 900 
(Tex. 2011)). 
 11. Id. (quoting Tawes v. Barnes, 340 S.W.3d 419, 425 (Tex. 2011)).  
 12. Id. (citing McBroome–Bennett Plumbing, Inc. v. Villa France, Inc., 515 S.W.2d 32, 37 
(Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1974, writ ref’d n.r.e.)). 
 13. See id. at 389–90. 
 14. The provision, commonly found in standard commercial property policies, provides:  
d.  We will not pay you more than your financial interest in the Covered Property. 
e.  We may adjust losses with the owners of lost or damaged property if other than 
you. If we pay the owners, such payments will satisfy your claims against us for the 
owners’ property. We will not pay the owners more than their financial interest in 
the Covered Property. 
Id. at 389. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. (emphasis added). 
 18. The provision, also commonly found in standard commercial property policies, provides: 
For Covered Property in which both you and a Loss Payee shown in the Schedule or 
in the Declarations have an insurable interest, we will: 
1.  Adjust losses with you; and 
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concluded was “not a clear promise by First Specialty to pay a loss payee for 
covered damage to covered property . . . . To the contrary, in [the “loss payable” 
provision], First Specialty assumes the duty of adjusting losses only with the 
named insured.”19 
In conclusion, the court in Ostrovitz explained that the proper legal test was 
whether the policy “clearly and fully spells out an intention by [the named 
insured] and [the insurer] to confer a direct benefit on [the loss payee].”20 In 
cases of “any reasonable doubt,” the court must rule against the purported third-
party beneficiary.21 Because the policy in this matter did not “clearly and fully 
spell out the necessary intention,” the landlord’s breach of contract claim failed 
as a matter of law.22 
Ostrovitz may signal to landlords and their agents that it is in their best 
interest to procure their own property insurance, even if there is a perceived 
financial advantage in shifting this burden to the tenant. Furthermore, tenants 
required to provide property insurance coverage for their landlords’ buildings 
may wish to obtain a separate policy in the landlord’s name, or add the landlord 
to the tenant’s own policy as an additional insured using ISO Endorsement 
Form CP 12 19, entitled “Additional Insured—Building Owner.”23 Landlords 
may also consider including a provision within the lease agreement allowing the 
landlord to inspect the tenant’s insurance policies to ensure compliance with 
any lease requirement of “additional insured” coverage for the landlord. Where 
the tenant breaches such an express requirement of the lease agreement, the 
landlord may have a valid claim for breach of contract against the landlord.24 
III.  COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE 
During the Survey Period, insurance litigation lasting nearly ten years finally 
reached the Texas Supreme Court in Lennar Corporation v. Markel Insurance 
Company.25 Here, the Supreme Court addressed multiple interpretative issues, 
including whether a commercial general liability insurance policy’s “voluntary 
payments” condition and “loss establishment” provision excused the insurer’s 
liability absent a showing of prejudice by the insurer.26 The Supreme Court also 
analyzed whether an insurer is liable for costs incurred to locate “property 
 
2.  Pay any claim for loss or damage jointly to you and the Loss Payee, as 
interests may appear. 
Id. at 390. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 393 (citing MCI Telecomms. Corp., 995 S.W.2d at 651). 
 21. Id. (citing First Union Nat’l Bank, 168 S.W.3d at 929). 
 22. Id. 
 23. By way of example, a 2007 sample version of this endorsement—CP 12 19 06 07—would 
list the building owner(s) within a schedule, and provide that “The building owner identified in 
this endorsement is a Named Insured, but only with respect to the coverage provided under this 
Coverage Part or Policy for direct physical loss or damage to the building(s) described in the 
Schedule.”, available at 
nationalunderwriterpc.moss.nuco.com/sites/fcsonline/commlin/formandend/ifor/commproend/
geneendser1/documents/CP%2012%2019%2006%2007.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2015)). 
 24. See, e.g., Bott v. J.F. Shea Co., Inc., 299 F.3d 508, 513 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 25. Lennar Corp. v. Market Ins. Co., 2013 WL 4492800 (Tex. Aug. 23, 2013). 
 26. Id. at *3–4. 
2014] Insurance Law 105 
damage” and costs to remediate “property damage” that began before and 
continued after the insurer’s policy period.27 In arguably the most significant 
Texas insurance decision in recent years, the Supreme Court held: (1) prejudice 
must be shown before an insurer may deny coverage based on the “voluntary 
payments” condition and (2) the “all-sums” approach to allocation of indemnity 
payments applies over the “pro rata” allocation approach.28 Additionally, the 
Supreme Court held that costs incurred to locate damage are damages “because 
of ‘property damage . . . .’”29 
A proper understanding of the Supreme Court’s decision requires an 
examination of the relevant facts surrounding the coverage dispute. From the 
early 1990s until 1998, Lennar Corporation and its subsidiaries (Lennar) built 
approximately 800 homes using synthetic exterior insulation and finish systems 
(EIFS).30 After a special on the NBC television show Dateline exposed the 
problems with EIFS in 1999, Lennar was flooded with homeowner complaints. 
Thereafter, Lennar’s investigation revealed that the problems were “frequent 
and substantial”; accordingly, Lennar decided to contact all of its homeowners—
not just the aggrieved ones—and offer to remove the EIFS and replace it with 
conventional stucco. Almost all of the homeowners accepted Lennar’s offer. 
During the early stages of the process, Lennar notified its insurers that it would 
seek indemnification for the costs of replacing the EIFS. The insurers, however, 
refused to participate in these efforts, preferring instead to address complaints as 
Lennar received them. 
Ultimately, all of Lennar’s insurers denied coverage, and after subsequent 
coverage litigation and settlement, Markel American Insurance Company 
(Markel) was the only remaining non-settling insurer. Markel insured Lennar 
under a commercial umbrella policy with a $25 million limit, with effective 
dates of coverage from June 1, 1999 through October 19, 2000. Markel had 
denied coverage for various reasons, including: 
• Lennar’s failure to comply with the “voluntary payments” condition 
requiring Lennar to obtain Markel’s consent prior to entering any 
settlements or assuming other obligations, along with the “loss 
establishment” provision prohibiting Lennar from independently 
determining a loss; 
• Any costs to remove and replace EIFS were preventative measures 
not incurred “because of . . . ‘property damage’”; and 
• Markel’s liability extended only to those damages occurring during 
its policy period.31 
On appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals examined whether Lennar’s 
expenses to remove and replace EIFS as a “preventative measure” were incurred 
“‘because of . . . property damage’” and, therefore, covered under the policy.32 
 
 27. Id. at *5–7. 
 28. See id. at *3–7. 
 29. Id. at *5. 
 30. Id. at *1. 
 31. Id. at *2. 
 32. Id. (citing Lennar Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 200 S.W.3d 651, 671 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) [hereinafter Lennar I]). 
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The court of appeal ultimately held that they were not, and that “Lennar must 
apportion the EIFS-related damages between its costs to remove and replace 
EIFS as a preventative measure and its costs to repair water damage to the 
homes.”33 Additionally, citing Hernandez v. Gulf Group Lloyds,34 the appellate 
court held that Markel’s liability was not excused pursuant to the “voluntary 
payments” condition or “loss establishment” provision “unless it could prove, as 
a matter of fact, that it had been prejudiced by Lennar’s settlements with 
homeowners.”35 After eight days of trial, the jury had failed to find prejudice to 
Markel, finding instead that the EIFS issues “‘create[d] an imminent threat to 
the health and safety of the inhabitants of the homes,’ and that Lennar took 
‘reasonable steps to cure the construction defect as soon as practicable and 
within a reasonable time.’”36 However, the court of appeal reversed and 
rendered judgment for Markel, concluding that Lennar did not show “its legal 
liability to the homeowners to trigger Markel’s coverage.”37 More specifically, the 
policy prohibited Lennar from showing legal liability to the homeowners 
through settlements to which Markel did not consent.38 
On Lennar’s petition for review, the Texas Supreme Court began its analysis 
with the “voluntary payments” condition and “loss establishment” provision.39 
Here, the Supreme Court discussed its decision in Hernandez, where the 
Supreme Court found that one party’s breach of contract does not excuse the 
other party’s performance, unless the breach is material and prejudices the non-
breaching party.40 The Supreme Court held that unless Markel could show that 
it was prejudiced by virtue of a settlement to which it did not agree, the 
“voluntary payments” condition and “loss establishment” provision could not 
bar coverage for Lennar.41 The Supreme Court reasoned that “[t]o allow 
[Markel] to argue that Lennar cannot use those non-prejudicial settlements to 
establish the amount of its loss would plainly subvert the requirement that 
Markel show that Lennar’s non-compliance was material.”42 Markel argued that 
it had been prejudiced as a matter of law because Lennar had solicited claims 
and, therefore, made repairs to homes where the homeowners would have likely 
never sought redress if Lennar had left them alone.43 At trial, the jury had not 
found Markel’s position convincing or concluded that Lennar’s remediation 
program was “anything other than a reasonable approach to a serious 
problem.”44 Because the Supreme Court found that prejudice is a question of 
fact, it refused to look behind the jury’s decision.45 
 
 33. Id. (quoting Lennar I, 200 S.W.3d at 679–80). 
 34. Hernandez v. Gulf Group Lloyds, 875 S.W.2d 691, 692–94 (Tex. 1994). 
 35. Lennar Corp., 2013 WL 4492800 at *2 (citing Lennar I, 200 S.W.3d at 695). 
 36. Id. at *3. 
 37. Id. (citing Markel Am. Ins. Co. v. Lennar Corp., 342 S.W.3d 704, 712–16 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. filed) [hereinafter Lennar II]), rev’d, 2013 WL 4492800). 
 38. Id. (citing Lennar II, 342 S.W.3d at 714–16). 
 39. Id. at *3. 
 40. Id. (citing Hernandez v. Gulf Group Lloyds, 875 S.W.2d 691, 692–94 (Tex. 1994)). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at *4. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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Markel also attempted to use the policy’s “loss establishment” provision to 
argue that it should not be required to show prejudice to be excused from its 
indemnification obligations.46 Here, the provision required Markel to pay 
Lennar’s “ultimate net loss” defined as “‘the total amount of [property] damages 
for which [Lennar] is legally liable,” and provided that such loss “‘may be 
established by adjudication, arbitration, or a compromise settlement to which 
we have previously agreed in writing.’”47 Thus, Markel contended that because it 
did not provide consent to Lennar’s settlements with the homeowners, Lennar 
could not establish a covered loss.48 The Supreme Court, however, disagreed, 
holding that prejudice was required and Lennar’s breach of the “loss 
establishment” provision was not material.49 The Supreme Court did not 
consider the “loss establishment” provision to be essential to coverage, and 
found that its purpose was effectively the same as the “voluntary payments” 
condition.50 
In analyzing the second and third issues, the Supreme Court first considered 
whether the policy provided coverage for the total amount of damages assessed 
by the jury.51 Pursuant to the policy’s insuring agreement, Markel was required 
to pay “‘the total amount’ of Lennar’s loss ‘because of’ property damage that 
‘occurred during the policy period,’ including ‘continuous or repeated exposure 
to the same general harmful conditions.’”52 In focusing on the “because of” 
language, the court of appeals held that coverage applied only to the cost to 
repair damages at the homes, and not the cost to locate the damages.53 Further, 
because Lennar did not isolate these two categories of damages, the court of 
appeal held that Lennar could not recover anything.54 The Supreme Court, 
however, quickly dismissed this reasoning, explaining that: 
Under no reasonable construction of the phrase can the cost of finding EIFS 
property damage in order to repair it not be considered to be “because of” the 
damage. We are not confronted with a situation in which the existence of 
damage was doubtful. Markel concedes that each of the 465 homes for which 
Lennar sought to recover remediation costs was actually damaged. Nor could 
Lennar have located all the damage, which was hidden from sight, without 
removing all the EIFS. The court of appeal’s characterization of efforts to 
determine all the damaged areas of homes as preventative measures is not 
supported by the record.55 
Lastly, the Supreme Court considered Markel’s argument that, because 
 
 46. Id. (“Markel argues that this Loss Establishment Provision, unlike [the “voluntary 
payments” condition] is central to the policy because of its ‘unmistakable language’ and its purpose 
in preventing insureds from determining loss unilaterally, and therefore any breach is material.”). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at *4–5 (“Absent prejudice to Markel, Lennar’s settlements with homeowners establish 
both its legal liability for the property damages and the basis for determining the amount of loss.”). 
 51. Id. at *5. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. (citing Markel Am. Ins. Co. v. Lennar Corp., 342 S.W.3d 704, 711 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. filed), rev’d, 2013 WL 4492800). 
 54. Id. (citing Markel, 342 S.W.3d at 712 n.5) (emphasis added). 
 55. Id. 
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Lennar could not seek coverage for damages occurring outside its policy period, 
and Lennar did not offer evidence distinguishing between damages occurring 
outside and within Markel’s period of coverage, Lennar could not recover 
anything.56 Evidence put forth at trial showed that Lennar quit using EIFS in 
1998, and that water damage from EIFS usually starts within six to twelve 
months after construction is finished.57 After first noting that a “fair inference” 
from the record indicated that most of the damages began either before or 
during Markel’s policy period and continued afterward, the Supreme Court 
explained that the policy “expressly includes damage from a continuous 
exposure to the same general harmful conditions.”58 Thus, “[f]or damage that 
occurs during the policy period, coverage extends to the ‘total amount’ of loss 
suffered as result, not just the loss incurred during the policy period.”59 
According to the Supreme Court, this meant that Markel had to pay all of the 
costs and expenses incurred in investigating and remediating the homes.60 
Here, the Supreme Court cited American Physician Insurance Exchange v. 
Garcia61—which rejected pro rata allocation, instead requiring insurers sharing 
liability for a loss to allocate among themselves according to their subrogation 
rights—in support of its holding.62 In Garcia, the plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendant insured physician’s negligent treatment spanned more than two years, 
during which the physician was covered by four non-overlapping policies, one 
with $100,000 in limits and the other three with $500,000 in limits.63 The 
plaintiffs took the position that the policies could be “stacked” to provide $1.6 
million in total coverage, and demanded settlement in that amount.64 The 
carriers rejected the demand, the plaintiffs obtained an excess judgment against 
the physician, the physician assigned his rights against the carriers to the 
plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs sued the carriers.65 Ultimately, the Texas Supreme 
Court rejected the plaintiff’s stacking theory, stating: 
If a single occurrence triggers more than one policy, covering different 
policy periods, then different limits may have applied at different times. In 
such a case, the insured’s indemnity limit should be whatever limit applied 
at the single point in time during the coverage periods of the triggered 
policies when the insured’s limit was highest . . . . Once the applicable limit 
is identified, all insurers whose policies are triggered must allocate funding 
of the indemnity limit among themselves according to their subrogation 
rights.66 
Although Markel characterized the quoted language as dicta, the Supreme 
 
 56. Id. at *6. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Am. Physician Ins. Exch. v. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1994).  
 62. Lennar Corp., 2013 WL 4492800 at *6. 
 63. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d at 843–44. 
 64. Id. at 845. 
 65. Id. at 845–46. 
 66. Id. at 855. 
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Court disagreed, refusing to reconsider Garcia in light of recent cases in 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and South Carolina applying pro rata 
allocation principles.67 
This opinion is important because it confirms that, under Texas law, absent 
prejudice caused by a settlement to which the insurer did not agree, the 
“voluntary payments” condition and “loss establishment” provision do not apply 
to bar coverage.68 Additionally, the case may have a significant impact on 
construction claims, as the Supreme Court has now seemingly opened the door 
for contractors to perform significant remediation of allegedly defective work 
without first obtaining consent from their insurers. Such covered costs may 
include “rip-and-tear” damages and other expenses associated with locating and 
remediating “property damage.”69 Notably, however, Lennar’s claim for “rip-and-
tear” damages only involved those homes that had actually been damaged by the 
defective EIFS.70 Thus, insurers may distinguish Lennar in cases where the 
insured submits a claim for costs to locate “property damage,” but it is ultimately 
determined that no “property damage” exists. 
Furthermore, Lennar provides a clear statement from the Supreme Court that 
the burden falls on the insurers sharing liability for a loss—not the insured—to 
allocate liability for the loss amongst themselves.71 Although this aspect of the 
high court’s ruling appears straightforward, unanswered questions remain 
regarding its application in this context, as the other carriers had already 
settled,72 seemingly leaving Markel with no real opportunity to negotiate with 
the other carriers regarding allocation. In Mid-Continent Insurance Company v. 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company,73 the Texas Supreme Court held that insurers 
may not seek reimbursement under their “other insurance” clauses through 
contribution or subrogation from a non-paying co-insurer for amounts paid to 
indemnify their common insured.74 In light of this limitation on the rights of 
insurers to demand contribution or subrogation from non-contributing insurers, 
it will be interesting to see how courts apply the Lennar holding that insurers 
must allocate liability among themselves where the loss spans multiple policy 
periods. 
It is anticipated that this opinion will lead to further litigation and legislation 
regarding these issues. In Garcia, the Texas Supreme Court held that 
“consecutive policies, covering distinct policy periods, could not be ‘stacked’ to 
multiply coverage for a single claim involving indivisible injury.”75 Instead, the 
insured’s indemnity limit will be “whatever limit applied at the single point in 
 
 67. Id. at *6–7 (citing Boston Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 454 Mass. 337, 910 N.E.2d 290 
(2009); EnergyNorth Natural Gas, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 156 N.H. 333, 934 A.2d 
517 (2007); Crossmann Communities of N.C., Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 395 S.C. 40, 717 
S.E.2d 589 (2011)). 
 68. Id. at *4–5. 
 69. See id. at *5–6. 
 70. See id. at *5. 
 71. See id. at *6–7. 
 72. Id. at *1. 
 73. Mid-Continent Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 236 S.W.3d 765 (2007). 
 74. Id. at 775–76. 
 75. Am. Physicians Ins. Exch. v. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d 842, 853 (Tex. 1994). 
110 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 1 
time during the coverage periods of the triggered policies when the insured’s 
limit was highest.”76 Therefore, although the Supreme Court in Lennar held that 
insurers with consecutive policies triggered by injuries spanning multiple policy 
periods must allocate the loss among themselves, by relying on Garcia, the 
Supreme Court seemingly implied that the insurers here would not be required 
to “stack” their policies; rather, the highest individual policy limit would apply. 
In addition, the Supreme Court’s seeming break from a strict policy-language 
driven analysis to a more results-oriented public policy approach may trigger 
modifications to existing policy language. According to Justice Boyd’s concurring 
opinion, and as a matter of jurisprudential philosophy, it may be that “the better 
choice for courts, as the Court noted in [Members Mutual Insurance Company v. 
Cutaia77], is if changes to insurance policy language are to be mandated . . . the 
changes should be left to the Legislature and regulatory agencies.”78 However, 
given that the decision was unanimous with only this sole concurring justice, 
Lennar may signal a broader shift in the Texas Supreme Court’s insurance 
jurisprudence from freedom-of-contract principles to a more policyholder-
friendly or results-oriented approach, so that even express policy language 
modifications would not alter future interpretation and application of Lennar. 
IV.  THE EIGHT-CORNERS RULE 
Over the past few years, several cases have addressed application of the eight-
corners rule (sometimes known as the complaint-allegation rule) in determining 
an insurer’s duty to defend. Based on these cases, it appeared that for the time 
being, Texas state and federal courts would strictly adhere to the eight-corners 
rule and would only deviate from the rule under limited circumstances. As 
evidenced by additional Fifth Circuit jurisprudence during the Survey Period, it 
appears that federal courts applying Texas law will continue to strictly follow this 
traditional analysis framework. However, in ascertaining whether basic, 
threshold contract requirements have been satisfied—such as whether a party 
qualifies as an additional insured—the federal courts may be more willing to look 
to extrinsic evidence in analyzing the duty to defend. 
A.  GENERAL RULE & INTERPRETATION 
In an important decision rendered nearly a decade ago in Farmers Texas 
County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Griffin, the Texas Supreme Court explained that a 
principal feature of the eight-corners rule is the focus on factual allegations 
rather than the legal theories pleaded.79 In that case, the Supreme Court 
analyzed a pleading containing a conclusory allegation of “negligence,” but 
refused to find that a conclusory “negligence” label was sufficient to trigger the 
 
 76. Id. at 856. 
 77. Members Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cutaia, 476 S.W.2d 278, 278 (Tex. 1972). 
 78. Lennar Corp. v. Markel Amr. Ins. Co., 2013 WL 4492800, at *11 (Tex. 2013) (Boyd, J., 
concurring) (quoting Prodigy Comm. Corp. v. Ag. Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 288 S.W.3d 374, 
388-89 (Tex. 2009) (Johnson, J., dissenting)). 
 79. Farmers Tex. Cty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 955 S.W.2d 81, 82–83 (Tex. 1997). 
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duty to defend where the alleged facts concerned an intentional shooting.80 
Interestingly, through the new Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard, federal 
courts have taken a similar approach in analyzing motions to dismiss, holding 
that legal labels and conclusory allegations are insufficient to withstand such 
motions.81 In combination, the Supreme Court of the United States in Bell 
Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly82 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal83 departed from the broad 
notice pleading standard, which provided that “a complaint should not be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the 
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle 
him to relief.”84 Instead, Twombly/Iqbal created a more rigorous pleading 
standard that—like the eight-corners rule—demands reliance on facts as opposed 
to mere legal labels or conclusions. 
Although it appears that neither the Texas federal courts nor the Fifth Circuit 
have expressly noted the similarities between the Griffin rule and this new 
federal pleading standard, a recent Fifth Circuit decision may signal a resurgence 
in this important principle that courts must focus on the factual allegations—not 
conclusory legal statements—in applying the eight-corners rule. 
In PPI Technology Services, L.P. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Royal 
Production Company, Inc. retained PPI to assist in planning and drilling oil and 
gas wells at three lease locations in Louisiana.85 After a well was dug, plugged, 
and abandoned at an incorrect lease, Royal and the non-operator working 
interest owners filed suit against PPI.86 Here, the underlying plaintiffs alleged 
that PPI had negligently drilled the well, thereby resulting in a dry hole. 
Additionally, the underlying plaintiffs alleged that PPI caused “‘property damage 
to Royal as an owner in the property where the well was being drilled’ including 
‘physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of the 
property.’”87 Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual) provided 
commercial general liability insurance coverage to PPI, which included liability 
coverage for “property damage” caused by an “occurrence.”88 The policy defined 
“property damage” as: 
a. Physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use 
of that property. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the 
time of the physical injury that caused it; or 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662 (2009). In applying this analysis to the complaint at issue in Iqbal, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that the complaint failed to cross “the line from conceivable to plausible.” Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662 at 680. More specifically, the Court concluded that the complaint’s “bare assertions, 
much like the pleading of conspiracy in Twombly amount to nothing more than a ‘formulaic 
recitation if the elements’ of a constitutional discrimination claim.” Id. at 681 (quoting Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 555). Thus, the Court in Iqbal found that dismissal was warranted under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 8. Id. at 683. 
 82. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544. 
 83. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662. 
 84. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). 
 85. 515 Fed. App’x 310, 311–12 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 86. Id. at 312. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 311. 
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b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. All 
such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the 
“occurrence” that caused it. 
Thus, the pleading expressly alleged the literal definition of “property damage” 
commonly found in commercial general liability policies. 
After PPI tendered defense of the lawsuit to Liberty Mutual, Liberty Mutual 
refused and denied coverage to PPI.89 PPI then sued Liberty Mutual, alleging 
breach of contract, breach of the Texas Insurance Code, and breach of the duty 
of good faith and fair dealing. After Liberty Mutual removed the case to federal 
court, PPI filed a motion for partial summary judgment regarding Liberty 
Mutual’s duty to defend. Liberty Mutual filed a cross-motion for summary 
judgment, asserting (among other things) that the underlying lawsuits did not 
include factual allegations of “property damage” caused by an “occurrence.” 
Ultimately, the district court concluded that the allegations concerning 
“property damage” were legal—rather than factual—allegations, as they “‘concern 
the definition and categorization of certain conduct and objects, rather than the 
facts giving rise to the alleged actionable conduct.’”90 Thus, as “‘mere legal 
assertions,’” the statements did not qualify as “‘allegations’” for purposes of 
applying the eight-corners rule.91 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court’s analysis, holding 
that mere allegations of “property damage” without some factual allegations of 
physical injury or loss of use of tangible property cannot trigger the insurer’s 
duty to defend.92 The court began by reciting the policyholder-friendly eight-
corners rule, which provides that “[i]f there is a ‘doubt as to whether or not the 
allegations of a complaint against the insured state a cause of action within the 
coverage of a liability policy sufficient to compel the insurer to defend the 
action, such doubt will be resolved in the insured’s favor.’”93 However, the Fifth 
Circuit concentrated on the language from Griffin that “‘[a] court must focus on 
the factual allegations rather than the legal theories asserted in reviewing the 
underlying petition.’”94 Returning to the allegations literally tracking the policy’s 
definition of “property damage,” the court found that the allegations were 
“either for economic damages, and thus are not covered, or are legal 
conclusions, rather than factual allegations” as required under the eight-corners 
rule.95 Because the underlying pleadings “did not allege facts supporting” these 
bare assertions of “property damage,” the court found that Liberty Mutual did 
not owe PPI a defense.96 
Although the Fifth Circuit in PPI did not delve into the apparent similarities 
 
 89. Id. at 312. 
 90. Id. (quoting PPI Tech. Servs., LP v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2012 WL 130389, at *11 (S.D. 
Tex. 2012) (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted)).  
 91. Id. at 312–13. 
 92. Id. at 313–14. 
 93. Id. at 313 (quoting Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Merchs. Fast Motor 
Lines, Inc., 939 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tex. 1997) (internal citations omitted)). 
 94. Id. at 314 (quoting Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 955 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Tex. 
1997). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
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of the eight-corners rule and Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard, the opinion’s 
language tracks that previously used by Texas federal courts in deciding motions 
to dismiss under the plausibility standard.97 Further, the Fifth Circuit’s finding 
in PPI that the underlying pleadings “did not allege facts supporting” the 
conclusory assertions echoes similar language used by the Fifth Circuit in 
deciding motions to dismiss under Twombly/Iqbal.98 Therefore, even if the Fifth 
Circuit will not expressly draw the connection between the eight-corners rule 
and Twombly/Iqbal, the court’s renewed focus on factual allegations rather than 
conclusory legal labels in the duty to defend analysis appears supported by the 
shift in federal pleading standards set forth in Twombly/Iqbal. 
B.  ADDITIONAL INSURED STATUS 
In last year’s Article, we discussed a Fifth Circuit decision concerning the use 
of extrinsic evidence in determining whether the “known loss” provision bars 
coverage.99 In Colony National Insurance Company v. Unique Industrial Product 
Company, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court improperly considered 
extrinsic evidence in applying the known-loss provision to a commercial general 
liability insurance policy, thereby refusing to apply any exception to the eight-
corners rule.100 However, in ACE American Insurance Company v. Freeport Welding 
& Fabricating, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit seemingly 
examined extrinsic evidence in determining whether Freeport Welding & 
Fabricating, Inc. qualified as an additional insured, although the Fifth Circuit 
did not expressly state that it was considering extrinsic evidence in reaching its 
conclusion.101 Because the operative contract did not impose an obligation to 
procure additional insured coverage, the court held that that the carrier had no 
duty to defend Freeport.102 
In 2008, Brand Industrial, L.L.C. (Brand Industrial)—a subsidiary of Brand 
Energy—entered into a purchase order agreement (the 2008 Purchase Order) 
with Freeport for the installation of a lining inside a quench chamber being 
constructed by Freeport.103 In January 2009, Brand Energy informed Freeport 
via letter that the project was turned over to Brand Energy; accordingly, Freeport 
and Brand Energy entered into a purchase agreement (the 2009 Purchase 
Agreement), effective January 1, 2009 until one of the parties canceled the 
 
 97. See, e.g., Reddish v. J.P. Morgan Chase, 2011 WL 573413, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2011), 
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 98. See, e.g., Greenhill v. U.S., ex rel. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 275 Fed. Appx. 315, 316 (5th 
Cir. 2008).  
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(5th Cir. 2012). 
 102. Id. at 843. 
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agreement. The 2009 Purchase Agreement required Brand Energy to procure 
commercial general liability coverage naming Freeport as an additional insured; 
however, the 2008 Purchase Order contained no such requirement. Brand 
Energy and its subsidiaries were covered under a commercial general liability 
policy issued by ACE, effective September 30, 2008, until September 30, 
2009.104 The policy had three additional insured provisions, all of which 
required that a written contract be entered into before the date of loss obligating 
Brand Energy to obtain additional insured coverage for the purported additional 
insured.105 
Installation of the lining began in May 2009, and was complete in August 
2009.106 In May 2009, several workers installing the lining for the quench 
chamber were injured and brought suit alleging negligence against Freeport and 
Brand Energy. The lawsuit did not mention the 2009 Purchase Agreement, or 
its requirement that Brand Energy provide additional insured coverage to 
Freeport. Freeport nevertheless sought defense and indemnity from ACE as an 
additional insured under the policy.107 ACE refused Freeport’s tender and 
brought a declaratory judgment action in the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas. After both parties moved for summary judgment, 
the district court held that ACE had no duty to defend Freeport because 
Freeport was not an additional insured under the policy.108 In addition, because 
the underlying lawsuit had not been resolved, the district court refused to 
determine whether ACE had a duty to indemnify Freeport.109 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit began by noting that, under Texas law, a court 
performing a duty to defend analysis must first determine whether the party 
claiming additional insured status qualifies as an additional insured under the 
policy.110 Where that party qualifies as an additional insured, “the court must 
then determine whether, under Texas’s eight-corners rule, the facts alleged in 
the underlying state court proceedings are sufficient to trigger the duty to defend 
under the policy.”111 The purported additional insured bears the burden of 
proof on these two issues, and “an affirmative answer to both is required to hold 
that there is a duty to defend.”112 After setting forth a comprehensive statement 
 
 104. Id. at 838. 
 105. More specifically, the policy included the following three additional insured 
endorsements: 
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 110. Id. at 839 (citing Gilbane Bldg. Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 664 F.3d 589, 594 (5th Cir. 
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of the standard for eight-corners review, the Fifth Circuit noted that “[o]nly a 
few Texas appellate courts have held that the examination of extrinsic evidence 
was warranted under an exception to the eight-corners rule.”113 More 
specifically, the exception applies only where “‘it is initially impossible to discern 
whether coverage is potentially implicated and when the extrinsic evidence goes 
solely to a fundamental issue of coverage which does not overlap with the merits 
of or engage the truth or falsity of any facts alleged in the underlying case.’”114 
Significantly, the Fifth Circuit began its additional insured analysis by stating 
that Gilbane Building Company v. Admiral Insurance Company required the court to 
review the 2009 Purchase Agreement—i.e., extrinsic evidence—in making its 
determination.115 Although the court had just stated the rule providing an 
exception to the strict eight-corners analysis, the court did not state that it was 
resorting to the exception by examining extrinsic evidence in making its 
additional insured determination. Thus, it is somewhat unclear whether the 
court was doing just that, or if the court was simply stating that the additional 
insured determination in this particular case required resort to extrinsic evidence. 
Based on its review of the 2009 Purchase Agreement, the Fifth Circuit 
ultimately found that Freeport qualified as an additional insured, but only for 
purchase orders made pursuant to the 2009 Purchase Agreement.116 More 
specifically, the court reasoned that the 2009 Purchase Agreement became 
effective January 1, 2009, and applied to purchase orders issued after the 
effective date.117 Furthermore, the 2008 Purchase Order pre-dated the 2009 
Purchase Agreement, and the 2009 Purchase Agreement did not reference the 
2008 Purchase Order or the lining project.118 The court therefore rejected 
Freeport’s argument that the 2009 Purchase Agreement applied retroactively, or 
applied to “all purchase orders.”119 Instead, the Fifth Circuit found that the 
work made the subject of the underlying lawsuit arose under the 2008 Purchase 
Order, and that the 2008 Purchase Order did not require Brand Energy to 
procure additional insured coverage for Freeport.120 As such, Freeport was not 
an additional insured under the policy with respect to the underlying lawsuit.121 
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Freeport is significant in that it raises important 
questions regarding Texas insurance law, and the Fifth Circuit’s approach to 
contract interpretation generally. By way of example, the court seemingly 
ignored Brand Energy’s letter to Freeport (i.e., a piece of extrinsic evidence), 
stating that Brand Industrial had turned the work requested in the 2008 
Purchase Order over to Brand Energy. Here, an argument exists that the letter 
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demonstrated the parties’ mutual understanding that at least some of the work 
to be performed pursuant to the 2009 Purchase Agreement was the work out of 
which the underlying plaintiffs’ injuries arose, especially given that the 2008 
Purchase Order stated the work would begin in the “‘2nd quarter of 2009.’”122 
The Fifth Circuit never expressly said that it was excluding the letter as extrinsic 
evidence, but devoted substantial attention to eight-corners jurisprudence within 
the opinion. To the extent neither the district court nor the Fifth Circuit 
applied the eight-corners rule to limit or exclude review of something, extensive 
citation to those rules would be meaningless. Overall, however, practitioners 
may agree that that the court applied a rigid construction of the parties’ 
agreement, thereby signaling that the contract drafting process should be 
similarly rigid so that no essential terms are omitted from the final draft. 
V.  THE STOWERS DOCTRINE 
For the greater part of the last century, Texas insureds caught in the cross-
hairs of liability disputes have enjoyed the protections created by the Texas 
Supreme Court in Stowers Furniture Company v. American Indemnity Company, 
which imposed a duty of reasonable care on a liability insurer considering an 
offer of settlement.123 Texas courts subsequently applying Stowers have held that 
an insurer may be held liable in excess of the policy limits for rejecting a 
settlement demand where (1) the claim is within the scope of coverage; (2) the 
settlement demand is within the policy limits; and (3) the terms are such that an 
ordinary prudent insurer would accept the demand, in light of the likelihood 
and degree of the insured’s potential exposure to a judgment in excess of the 
policy limits.124 During the Survey Period, the Fifth Circuit clarified the Stowers 
duties of insurers defending multiple insureds under the same policies, holding 
that insurers do not violate the Stowers doctrine by settling and exhausting policy 
limits on behalf of a single insured.125 
In Pride Transportation v. Continental Casualty Company, an employee of Pride 
Transportation—an interstate motor carrier—rear-ended a pickup truck, 
rendering the driver a paraplegic.126 At the time of the accident, Pride carried $1 
million in primary and $4 million in excess automobile liability insurance. The 
injured driver and his wife ultimately sued Pride and its employee, and the 
primary carrier assumed the defense of both. The employee’s counsel placed the 
value of the case between $8 and $10 million, and Pride’s counsel recognized 
the “‘real possibility’” that liability exceeded $5 million. Further, the plaintiffs’ 
counsel had recently obtained a $25 million verdict in a similar case in the 
county. Especially damaging for Pride’s employee, during discovery, the parties 
found out that the employee had falsified her driver logs to avoid work 
restrictions, thereby likely increasing her liability exposure and, accordingly, the 
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insurers’ potential risk.127 
Prior to trial, the underlying plaintiffs made an expiring settlement offer to 
Pride’s employee for the full policy limits (i.e., $5 million), in exchange for a full 
release of the employee.128 Thereafter, Pride’s primary insurer tendered its limits 
to Pride’s excess insurer, and the excess insurer assumed control of the defense. 
Pride requested that the excess insurer seek a counter-offer of $5 million to 
release both insureds; however, the excess insurer refused to do so unless both 
insureds consented to the counteroffer. The employee rejected this proposal and 
insisted that the excess carrier accept the initial settlement offer, which it did. 
Pride then filed a cross-claim for indemnity against the employee in the 
underlying lawsuit. Because the settlement exhausted Pride’s policy limits, both 
insurers notified Pride that they were withdrawing from the defense. Both the 
excess insurer and Pride then brought declaratory judgment actions seeking a 
determination of the insurers’ obligations under the policies, which were 
consolidated in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas.129 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurers, and Pride 
appealed. 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding 
that the excess insurer was within its rights to withdraw its defense of Pride after 
the insurer exhausted its limits through the $5 million settlement.130 According 
to the Fifth Circuit, “insured parties have limited recourse against insurers in 
Texas for the handling of third-party insurance claims,” because “[t]here is no 
duty of good faith and fair dealing owed to the insured in this context . . . .”131 
Rather, an insurer’s “common law duties are limited to contractual obligations 
and the Stowers duty to accept a reasonable settlement demand.”132 Here, the 
Fifth Circuit first noted a line of cases—beginning with Farmers Insurance 
Company v. Soriano—that held that an insurer faced with a settlement demand 
“‘arising out of multiple claims and inadequate proceeds’” may reasonably settle 
one of the multiple claims, “‘even though such settlement exhausts or 
diminishes the proceeds available to satisfy other claims.’”133 Further, the 
“reasonableness” of such a settlement is determined solely by the merits of the 
settled claim, and the insured’s potential liability on that claim.134 The Fifth 
Circuit explained that it had previously interpreted Soriano as extending to cases 
with multiple insured defendants.135 
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Thus, pursuant to Soriano, Pride’s excess insurer could not be liable for failing 
to settle the remaining claims against Pride unless there was evidence that either 
(1) the excess insurer negligently rejected the plaintiffs’ demand for settlement 
within policy limits or (2) the original settlement demand was itself 
unreasonable.136 Here, the parties agreed that the insurers did not reject any 
settlement demands made to Pride or its employee; rather, Pride sought to 
impose liability on its insurers for accepting a demand, and the Fifth Circuit 
refused to extend the Stowers duty to impose liability in that scenario.137 Pride’s 
common law claims therefore rested on its insurers’ contractual duties—i.e., to 
reasonably settle claims.138 Further, the insurers no longer had a duty to defend 
once their policy limits were exhausted by judgments or settlements, and the 
policies clothed the insurers with the contractual right to settle claims where 
appropriate.139 
Although Pride attempted to argue that there was an issue of material fact 
concerning reasonableness of the settlement, the Fifth Circuit disagreed.140 
More specifically, the Fifth Circuit found that Pride had not highlighted any 
evidence tending to show that the settlement was unreasonable.141 The court 
quickly dismissed Pride’s argument that the settlement was unreasonable based 
on the residual liability the employee faced by Pride’s indemnity claim, as the 
excess policy “explicitly exempt[ed] claims or suits brought by one insured 
against another.”142 As such, and “[b]ecause of the likelihood and degree of 
potential exposure to excess judgment” for the employee, the Fifth Circuit held 
that the settlement was reasonable as a matter of law, and did not result in a 
breach of the policies.143 The court therefore affirmed the district court’s ruling 
that Pride’s insurers acted reasonably in accepting the settlement, despite the 
fact that unsettled claims remained against Pride.144 
Although Pride offers support for insurers encountering policy-limit 
settlement demands against a single insured where multiple insureds have been 
sued, insurers may be prudent to still explore the possibility of a general release 
for all insureds. Such efforts, even where rejected by the plaintiffs, may benefit 
the insurer to the extent the insurer is later charged with bad faith for settling 
on behalf of less than all insureds. Further, the decision may inadvertently 
provide additional Stowers leverage to plaintiffs in multiple-defendant cases, as 
the insurer may now be forced to accept policy limit demands that release 
some—but not all—insured defendants. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
During this Survey period, Texas courts continued to examine important 
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issues arising under various insurance policies affecting both policyholders and 
insurers. Significantly, the Texas Supreme Court confirmed that, absent 
prejudice to the insurer caused by a settlement to which the insurer did not 
agree, the “voluntary payments” condition does not apply to bar coverage. 
Additionally, in a shift from a policy language-driven analysis to a more results-
oriented public policy approach, the Supreme Court seemingly opened the door 
to contractors arguing that prophylactic measures are covered by their 
commercial general liability insurance policies. 
Furthermore, a Texas appellate court held that a loss payee did not have 
standing to sue the named insured’s insurer for breach of contract. Rather, the 
insurer had the right—but was under no obligation—to adjust the loss with the 
loss payee. Following this opinion, Texas landlords would be wise to insist on 
“additional insured” rather than loss payee status under their tenants’ policies, 
or obtain their own policy altogether. 
With respect to the federal courts, the Fifth Circuit—without expressly stating 
that it was doing so—demonstrated the similarities between the Twombly/Iqbal 
pleading standard and the eight-corners rule. More specifically, the court will 
only consider factual allegations (not legal labels or conclusions) in ascertaining 
the insurer’s duty to defend. Additionally, the Fifth Circuit seemingly 
considered extrinsic evidence, again without expressly stating that it was doing 
so, in making an “additional insured” determination. 
Lastly, the Fifth Circuit had occasion to elaborate on application of the 
Stowers doctrine, specifically where the insurer receives a policy limit settlement 
demand against a single insured where multiple insureds have been sued. 
Although the decision held that such insurers are not liable under Stowers for 
entering into such settlements, insurers may still be prudent to explore the 
possibility of a general release of all insureds. 
